Guest Viewpoint: EICC-GeSI Conflict Minerals Workshop in Brussels

Elm welcomes Michele Bruelhart as a guest blogger.  Michele is the Global Traceability Manager with UL-STR in Burundi and attended the EICC-GeSI Workshop held in Brussels recently.  She provided Elm with her perspective on the meeting, and regional progress on conflict minerals programs/infrastructure.

 

The challenges surrounding supply chain traceability of so called “conflict minerals” continue to be discussed in numerous fora in Europe and the US. Starting with roundtable consultations organized by the World Gold Council, the EICC-GeSI Group and the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA) held their conferences last week in Brussels which will be followed by the launch of a Public-Private Alliance for Responsible Minerals Trade in October and lastly a meeting of the OECD hosted working group on the implementation of the Due Diligence Guidance in November.

Broadly speaking, participants of these meetings appear divided into two groups: those contributing to discussions on the 3Ts (tin, tantalum and tungsten) and those trying to address the issues around gold. For the former, the EICC-GeSI Workshop provided an overview on the latest progress (or lack thereof) since their previous workshop in June of this year. Some of the main points from Brussels are summarized below:

• The EICC-GeSI reporting template for the downstream supply chain is publicly available and has been piloted by a number of companies. While the tool itself was found to be helpful, it does not address the main challenge faced by end-user companies, which are (1) how to reduce the complexity and number of suppliers standing between the end product and the smelter in their supply chains and (2) how to get responses from supplier, investing a reasonable amount of time and resources.
• The hours required to obtain a completed reporting template from all suppliers seem disproportionate to the information sought. Furthermore, the data provided by suppliers is not validated or verified externally. Lastly, the tool merely allows companies to gather information “backwards” for a finished product, rather than “forwards” (i.e., trying to prevent conflict minerals from entering the supply chain).  By the time all the information is collected and compiled, the product will most likely have been sold already, whether smelters used for its production were “conflict-free” or not. Given these limitations, it is not clear if the template truly responds to the needs of companies that are required to report under Section 1502 of the Dodd Frank Act. [Ed. note – this process/timing gap may also create liabilities in the context of representations and warranties made about the nature or status of the material, which could be proven incorrect once all relevant information is available].

• Investing time and resources to gather information from suppliers regarding the smelters used in a company’s supply chain makes sense only if there is a sizeable list of conflict-free smelters that have been approved in the framework of the Conflict Free Smelter Program. So far, this list comprises six tantalum smelters. Assessment protocols for the other metals have been published this summer, though to date no smelters for tin and tungsten or refineries for gold have been approved as “conflict-free”. Despite the progress made in this program and the EICC-GeSI’s repeated assurances that it remains possible for smelters to source from the African Great Lakes region, the requirements defined for smelters to continue purchasing minerals from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) or its neighbors provide a significant disincentive to do so. The assessment protocols list a number of conditions that must be fulfilled for minerals from the Great Lakes region. Among those figure full traceability for the shipment – something that has not been achieved yet for three of the DRC’s four affected provinces – and the implementation of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance. On the latter, it remains to be seen how this criteria should be implemented as the OECD is stressing that its Guidance should be understood as a process over time, whereas a mineral purchase is a punctual transaction. [Ed. note:  As Elm previously reported, OECD has softened its stance on its Guidance.  In addition, EICC CFS audits may not be completed in time for many companies to use them for purposes of fiscal year 2012 SEC compliance].

• In the region itself, progress has been quite significant. The DRC Government is about to make the implementation of the OECD Guidance a requirement for companies bearing administrative sanction, mine site inspections have taken place at over 30 mine sites in North Kivu and the Government expects to be ready to issue regional certificates for its minerals within the ICGLR framework by the end of 2011. ITRI’s tag-and-bag scheme is targeting 75% of the 3Ts from Katanga province to be tagged by the end of this year and the German federal institute BGR has validated 35 mines against its Certified Trading Chains Standard.

Nevertheless, some important issues were not addressed during the Brussels workshop:

• First and foremost, it remains unclear if the Congolese Government has the financial and human capacity to enforce the various rules and regulations that were passed over the last couple of months. In particular as the country is preparing for Presidential elections in November, no concrete plans for the enforcement of recently taken measures were presented, nor does the Government appear to take a clear leadership role in coordinating the various efforts on the ground.
• For the in-region tracing or certification schemes, the monitoring and evaluation process of participating companies is not fully transparent. In the case of the mine visits of the DRC Government, no information is provided on the standards applied to flag a specific mine green, orange or black or the qualifications of the mine inspectors. For BGR’s and ITRI’s certification and traceability schemes, the boundaries between baseline assessments, preparation of participating companies, third party verification and remediation are not clearly defined. The absence of clearly defined tasks may lead to potential conflicts of interest where verifiers could be consulting and auditing the same companies.
• The presentation of Gregory Mthembu-Salter of the United Nations Group of Experts (UN GoE) on the Democratic Republic of Congo painted a rather grim picture of the likelihood to see any of the above schemes being implemented in the Kivu provinces. The security situation in the Kivus renders the implementation of any traceability scheme difficult and the level of due diligence required from buyers in ensuring their purchases do not benefit armed groups appears to be prohibitively high.
• The highly unique aspects of the gold supply chain and its traceability remain unresolved.  There are growing doubts that a viable framework applicable to gold will be available in the near future.

Despite these activities along the entire mineral supply chain there remains much to be done to establish credible systems of assurance in the African Great Lakes region that satisfy the needs of end user companies obliged to report on the origin of their raw materials.

OECD Backs Up A Step on Conflict Minerals Guidance

IPC has announced a pilot study of the OECD due diligence guidance that will run until June 2012.  Elm confirmed that this study is an OECD-lead study intended to help the OECD identify important changes to their document.

We recently wrote about views expressed by companies who tried to implement the Guidance earlier with little success.  Another post dealt with the inconsistencies between the OECD Guidance and SEC standards for auditors and auditing engagements.

It appears that OECD has capitulated – essentially reverting the status of their “final” standard back to a draft.  While that may be good news to some extent, critical questions arise about the uncertainty it creates in the content of SEC’s upcoming final regulations, as well as how the project timing will impact companies seeking to implement a program to meet 2012 or even 2013 reporting.

OECD to SEC: Make us the Conflict Minerals Due Diligence/Audit Standard for the US

ITRI reported the following yesterday:

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is expected to make a formal request that the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) makes explicit reference to existing, internationally agreed due diligence guidelines when it releases new “conflict minerals” reporting rules shortly. The SEC is in the final stages of considering the interpretation of the US Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and may release the new ‘rules’ sometime in August. The OECD believes that its own guidelines, together with those set out by the UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo, can be used to help clarify definitions of “not DRC conflict free” and “DRC conflict free” under the US law.

OECD has drafted a letter to SEC and is looking for companies or associations willing to support the concept of progressive due diligence and improvement of mining circumstances in the central African region, and to request clarification of the expectations for company reporting in terms of the ‘conflict mineral’ issue.

Elm recently reported on certain US industry views on the OECD standard, which includes general concerns about potential inconsistencies with SEC auditor standards.  These concerns are relevant to not only the audits themselves, but the scope of the supply chain management programs, audit preparations and a range of potentially significant liabilities.  Elm shares these views; the following table highlighting the main points.

OECD Guidance	Comments
Step 2.II  DOWNSTREAM COMPANIES Downstream companies who may find it difficult to identify actors upstream from their direct suppliers (due to their size or other factors), may engage and actively cooperate with other industry members with whom they share suppliers or downstream companies with whom they have a business relationship to carry out the recommendation in this section in order to identify the smelters/refiners in their supply chain and assess their due diligence practices or identify through industry validation schemes the refiners/smelters that meet the requirements of this Guidance in order to source therefrom.	Supply chain due diligence activities undertaken with suppliers/others with business relationships or members of industry association-sponsored conflict minerals audit programs conflicts with the Auditor Independence elements in Step 4.A.3.a.
Step 4.A contains the OECD’s standards for independent third party audits of smelter/refiner due diligence practices, but continues (Step 4.B.1): … all actors in the supply chain should cooperate through their industry organisations to ensure that the auditing is carried out in accordance with audit scope, criteria, principles and activities listed above [in Step 4.A.]. Also provides additional SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS for exporters, traders, re-processors and downstream companies within the context of the smelter/refiner audit scope.	Creates significant ambiguity in the intended audit scope: are the audits of exporters, traders, re-processors and downstream companies to be included as part of – or directly involved in – the smelter audit? Additionally, this conflicts with the Auditor Independence elements in Step 4.A.3.a.
Step 4.A.3.a    The Audit Principles: Independence To preserve neutrality and impartiality of audits, the audit organisation and all audit team members (“auditors”) must be independent from the smelter/refiner as well as from smelter/refiner’s subsidiaries, licensees, contractors, suppliers and companies cooperating in the joint audit. This means, in particular, that auditors must not have conflicts of interests with the auditee including business or financial relationship with the auditee (in the form of equity holdings, debt, securities), nor have provided any other services for the auditee company, particularly any services relating to the due diligence practice or the supply chain operations assessed therein, within a 24 month period prior to the audit.	SEC has long-established standards and regulations for auditor independence in the US.  Those standards have been tested/validated in the US legal system.  There is no need for untested duplicative standards that do not specifically reflect US law and that apply only to a single set of SEC audits. Other forms of impairments to auditor independence from SEC’s “Yellow Book” (GAO-07-731G) not indicated by OECD: Personal impairments including preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of a particular program that could bias the audit; and biases, including those resulting from political, ideological, or social convictions that result from membership or employment in, or loyalty to, a particular type of policy, group, organization, or level of government.  Given the emotional nature of underlying issues (human rights atrocities, subsistence livelihood of artisanal miners), personal impairments are highly relevant in these audits. External impairmentsare pressures, actual or perceived, from management and employees of the audited entity or oversight organizations, which includes: external interference or influence that could improperly limit or modify the scope of an audit or threaten to do so; external interference with the selection or application of audit procedures or in the selection of transactions to be examined; the authority to overrule or to inappropriately influence the auditors’ judgment as to the appropriate content of the report. Direct involvement in audit processes by industry associations, NGOs, business competitors and customers alike create a high likelihood of these (and similar) external impairments. As is detailed in other sections of this comparison table, this OECD auditor independence standard conflicts with other elements of the Guidance and increases annual audit costs for companies by mandating “rotating auditors” for annual audits.
Step 4.A.3.b.  The Audit Principles:  Competence Auditors should conform to the requirements set out in Chapter 7 of ISO 19011 on Competence and Evaluation of Auditors.	ISO is not meaningful within the context of legally-mandated audits under SEC jurisdiction.  Such audits are no longer a voluntary standard as is ISO. The audited companies – and auditors themselves – face significant risks related to SEC compliance, reputation and a broad range of consequential liabilities that are addressed far better by specific SEC audit/auditor standards than a general voluntary framework with no direct governmental involvement or support.
Step 4.A.4.b.  The Audit Principles:  Document Review … all records on business partners and suppliers, interviews and on-the-ground assessments…	SEC audit standards are based on “reasonable assurance” and “representative sampling”.  Audit tasks seeking 100% certainty or review are not appropriate/feasible except in limited circumstances. Where expectations are based on 100% certainty or review, auditors face significant and unreasonable liabilities.
Step 4.A.4.c.  The Audit Principles:  In-site Investigations In-site investigations should include… ii.  A sample of the smelter/refiner’s suppliers (both international concentrate traders, re-processors and local exporters), which includes supplier facilities	Suggests the auditors visit another company’s facilities. The auditor faces multiple uncontrolled business liability risks in this “extended audit” scope unless the auditor has a separate specific contract with that supplier.  Such a contractual relationship conflicts with the Auditor Independence elements in Step 4.A.3.a.
4.A.4.c.  The Audit Principles:  In-site Investigations In-site investigations should include… iv.  Consultations with local and central governmental authorities, UN expert groups, UN peacekeeping missions and local civil society.	Suggests direct involvement of external parties in the audit process, an inappropriate extension of audit scope. An auditor may not be able to confirm/verify the information presented by these external parties.  This also presents a potential for inadvertent breach of confidential business information.
4.A.4.d  The Audit Principles:  Audit Conclusions Auditors should generate findings that determine, based on the evidence gathered, the conformity of the smelter/refiner due diligence for responsible supply chains of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas with this Guidance.	The findings envisioned by OECD are based on conformity and not fully consistent with the requirements of Section 1502(b), which requires the audit to include additional information (“compliance”). A substantial body of information over more than 15 years related to ISO14010/14011 (Environmental Management Systems Auditing, now superseded by ISO 19011) demonstrates there is typically a significant gap between the outcome of conformity audits versus compliance audits.
4.B.1.d  SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS – For all downstream companies It is recommended that all downstream companies participate and contribute through industry organisations or other suitable means to appoint auditors and define the terms of the audit in line with the standards and processes set out in this Guidance. Small and medium enterprises are encouraged to join or build partnerships with such industry organisations.	As explained above, this program element conflicts with the Auditor Independence elements in Step 4.A.3.a.
Step 4.B.2  INSTITUTIONALISED MECHANISM FOR RESPONSIBLE SUPPLY CHAINS OF MINERALS FROM CONFLICT AFFECTED AND HIGH-RISK AREAS. All actors in the supply chain, in cooperation and with the support of governments and civil society, may consider incorporating the audit scope, criteria, principles and activities set out above into an institutionalized mechanism that would oversee and support the implementation of due diligence for responsible supply chains of minerals from conflict-affected and high- risk areas. The institution should carry out the following activities: a)  With regard to audits: i)  Accrediting auditors; ii) Overseeing and verifying audits; iii)Publishing audit reports with due regard to business confidentiality and competitive concerns. b)  Develop and implement modules to build capabilities of suppliers to conduct due diligence and for suppliers to mitigate risk. c)  Receive and follow-up on grievances of interested parties with the relevant company.	This takes key audit oversight out of SEC’s hands and places the responsibilities directly with a group of representatives from the regulated community, creating a major gap in auditor standards and dramatic potential for auditor impairment as discussed above in Step 4.A.3.a. Research indicates there is no precedent in any other legally-mandated audit program under SEC that defers this level of direct management and oversight to an industry group or other non-governmental organization.

Guest Perspective: Is the Dodd-Frank Act Conflict Minerals requirement the next Proposition 65?

Ed. note:  We are fortunate to count Mark Schaffer as an Elm Affiliate.  Mark is located in Austin, Texas and runs Schaffer Environmental, providing a range of supply chain, sustainability and product content consulting support to the computer, technology and electronics industries.  Mark submitted the following piece on conflict minerals from his perspective on other product content matters.

The Dodd-Frank Act requires companies regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to report whether their products contain conflict minerals from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and other nearby countries.  These conflict minerals are defined as cassiterite, columbite-tantalite, gold, wolframite and their derivatives (tin, tantalum and tungsten) – though, in the future, more minerals may be added to this list.

These materials are found in a variety of consumer products that we love to use everyday, from computers to cell phones, golf clubs to fishing weights.  So, to the purchaser of these consumer products, what is the real impact of whether the product contains one of these minerals sourced from the Congo?

Currently, the exact reporting requirements are still not established.  The law requires manufacturers sourcing “conflict minerals” to include information on their sourcing in their websites.  The SEC regulations, scheduled to be finalized in third or fourth quarter 2011, will clarify what disclosures will be required within the financial reports to SEC.  Further sourcing disclosure may even end up on the product or the product packaging.

Granted, business-to-business contracts, relationships and purchasing requirements are already being impacted by the supply chain traceability mandates – but what might this all mean to the consumer and the choices they make?

At best, the disclosures will be an awareness point for consumers, but will it truly affect their purchase of the product?  Unless there is a price differential between products, only the most conscientious consumers will be deterred from buying and using products containing DRC-sourced materials.

In addition, consumer confusion is likely to result where companies use/disclose “Non-conflict DRC materials”.  This is material that originates from the conflict areas (DRC and adjoining countries) but is obtained from a legitimate source verified as not funding or contributing to the region’s armed conflict and human right violations.

In a similar fashion, California Proposition 65 requires a notification of the presence of substances that have been determined to be cancer causing and/or damaging to the reproductive system by the State of California.  A warning is often seen printed on the packaging of products or on tags and labels of products indicating the presence of materials in the product that could cause cancer, birth defects or other reproductive harm.

Even this type of warning does not deter the consumer from purchasing the product.  It is likely that a conflict-warning label, if that became a requirement, would have similar negligible effect in product sales.  There will be even less of a measurable impact on sales/revenue if the warning is limited to disclosures within a corporate Form 10-K report.  Placement in a 10-K will raise visibility to investors in the company producing those products but unless there is a clear impact on the bottom-line profits or revenue, will that be enough incentive to change sourcing practices?

The strength of a “notification” regulation lies in a company’s desire to avoid “label shame.”  Manufacturers of products covered by Prop 65 have made changes to the materials they use such that their products no longer need the warning label.   So, even though not all consumers changed their purchasing habits due to the presence of those warnings, manufacturers worked (and still work) to replace those materials with safer alternatives.  The Dodd-Frank Act may ultimately have similar effect in transforming the material choices and sourcing.

At the same time, however, there is growing evidence of consumer “label fatigue,” indicating that consumers are paying less attention to these labels or feel they are not credible, especially where the labels – and their form/content – are not mandated by law.  This is perhaps most prevalent in “green” product labels and certifications.

Recent history tells us that the Dodd-Frank conflict minerals requirements may indeed promote change, though that change is slower than would occur from an outright restriction or ban on the use of those materials.  For example, the most recent impactful “banning” restriction, the EU Restriction on Hazardous Substances (RoHS) went into effect July 1, 2006 after many years of development.  Due to the demand by the electronics industry for parts that could meet the RoHS requirements by that date, the supply chain transformed rapidly using alternative materials and techniques.

 

 

SEC Provides Preview of April 15 Final Rules on Conflict Minerals Supply Chain Traceability

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FOR AN UPDATE ON SEC’S DELAY OF THE FINAL RULE, CLICK HERE.

As veterans of regulatory research, we are accustomed to spending hours poring over a plethora of governmental regulations, background documents, guidance and other reports.  Our work with conflict minerals supply chain traceability and SEC’s regulations has been no different.  In addition to having completed such audits, we have read and re-read

• the proposed SEC regulation and its preamble;
• the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Materials from Conflict-Affected and High Risk Areas, and the Supplement on Tin, Tantalum and Tungsten;
• the ISO 19011 standard;
• comments submitted to the SEC on the proposed regulation (approximately 700 total comments were submitted, of which 433 were standard form letters.  Of the remaining 270, approximately 75% provide substantive content);
• hundreds of relevant media reports, legal advisories and NGO documents;
• various auditor standards under SEC, including Government Accounting Office Government Accounting Standards GAO-07-731G, AICPA Statements on Standards for Attestation Engagements (SSAEs); and
• industry commentary and alerts on the topic.

Yesterday, we completed an analysis of the 263-page report from the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) titled US Securities and Exchange Commission Organizational Study and ReformMarch 10, 2011 to see what insight might be hidden therein on the upcoming final conflict minerals regulations.

BCG’s report establishes the ultimate context for the other documents which, in turn, essentially provides a preview of the final rule.  Our opinion is that SEC will meet the statutory deadline of April 15 with a rule that will:

• clarify procedural aspects, such as applicable audit standards (i.e., GAO-07-731G, AICPA SSAE, etc), the need for annual audits and the question of “furnishing” versus “filing” the report;
• establish a materiality threshold for conflict minerals content in products;
• specifically exclude retailers and contract manufacturing arrangements under certain conditions;
• defer most substantive compliance requirements to allow further study; and
• defer the initial reporting compliance date.

By doing this, SEC can meet competing priorities with which it is currently struggling.  Such a rule would appease the regulated community and buy SEC time, while allowing SEC to claim victory in meeting the legal deadline.  During the deferral period, we expect SEC will implement its overarching organizational restructuring and internal risk assessment processes spelled out in the BCG report, then come to a final position on Section 1502(b).

What does this mean for companies impacted by the due diligence/audit requirements?

We have written and directly counseled clients and others on business risks associated with completing the audits in advance of the final SEC rules.  As we see it, the risks are somewhat different depending on your company:

• Companies directly regulated by SEC. Audits conducted “pre-rule” risk being non-compliant with the final SEC requirements.  Early adopters may be faced with paying for audits a second time to achieve compliance.  Reputational damage is possible where companies publicize or market the results of audits that are non-conforming to the final rule.  At an extreme, companies could face lawsuits over nonconforming audits in a manner similar to lawsuits filed for non-GAAP financial reporting or certain corporate social responsibility reports.
• Privately-held companies responding to customer demands. For these companies, the risk is not compliance oriented, but centers on unnecessary costs and reputational damage.  Where customers demand this information of suppliers, the demands must be met.  The question becomes is SEC compliance driving the customer’s request?  If so, (assuming our prediction is correct) the customer’s need may not be so urgent or burdensome as originally thought; and early adopter efforts on the supplier’s part may be overkill/overly expensive in light of a rule deferral period.  Legal action from customers who rely on the “pre-rule” audit information and reputational damage are both possible where companies publicize or market the results of audits that are non-conforming to the final rule.  Suppliers would be wise to work with customers to find an acceptable balance between the drivers, timing, scope and cost.

Companies want to be proactive and responsible corporate citizens.  But we live in a command-and-control legal setting – combined with third-party lawsuits and governmental performance metrics that incentivize fines, penalties/aggressive enforcement.  Early action in a time of regulatory uncertainty carries risk.  In US corporate sustainability activities, this is perhaps most vividly demonstrated by last year’s complete collapse of the voluntary US GHG emissions trading market - specifically established in advance of US legal requirements on GHGs to create “first mover advantage”.

Elm continues to recommend that companies move forward with implementation evaluation, scoping and planning activities, but wait for SEC’s rule to be finalized before conducting audits.

Joseph Cotier, CPEA joins The Elm Consulting Group International LLC

The Elm Consulting Group International LLC, a specialty health, safety, environmental and sustainability (HSES) management consulting firm, is pleased to announce the addition of Joseph B. Cotier, CPEA as a Director of the firm beginning January 3, 2011.

“Joe brings 22 years experience in HSE auditing excellence and client focus to our team” said Patrick Doyle, Elm’s founder and Managing Director.  “He is a perfect complement to the firm.”

“I have known Joe personally and professionally for close to 20 years and know first hand about his expertise and exemplary qualifications.  We are very excited to have him become a part of Elm” said Robert Bray, Elm Co-Founder and Managing Director.

Cotier said, “I am happy to be a part of Elm and look forward to continuing to have a positive impact on the HSE auditing field – driving innovation both in the US and across the globe.”

Joseph B. Cotier, CPEA, has completed more than 350 EHS audits and management systems consulting projects in more than 35 states and 20 countries.   He has experience in a wide range of industries including petroleum refining and chemical manufacturing, electric utilities, breweries and consumer and pharmaceutical products manufacturing. Mr. Cotier is an air emissions expert with particular strengths in emissions inventories, leak detection and repair, and a wide variety of MACT programs.  Joe his has performed inspections and managed compliance orders as a Senior Air Pollution Control Engineer for the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection. He is a BEAC Certified Professional Environmental Auditor and recently completed his fifth year on the Board of Directors for The Auditing Roundtable, the leading professional association for HSE auditors.   He served as Secretary, Vice President and President, and now serves the Roundtable as Director on the Board.

Mr. Cotier will be working out of Glastonbury, Connecticut and can be reached at jcotier@elmgroup.com, +1-860-794-3617 (cell) or +1-860-430-1653 (office).

In Tampa, a Mining Company Shutdown Highlights Business Interruption Risk from Environmental Issues

In Tampa Bay, an all-to-real demonstration is playing out of the trickle-down economic impact of a company operation being shut down for environmental reasons.  The Tampa Bay Business Journal reported this story.

The Mosaic Co. is a publicly-traded company with over $6billion in annual revenue reported last fiscal year.  Mosaic mines phosphate ore.  The company has been mining in Polk County since 1995 and recently filed for an expansion of operations to access reserves in Hardee County.  These ore reserves represent about 10 years of active mining operations.

The Sierra Club, along with other NGOs challenged the issuance of a federal permit that would allow Mosaic to expand, alleging that the expanded operations would cause environmental damage to the headwaters of the Peace River and other streams that drain into the Charlotte Harbor estuary.

On July 30, in response to the challenge

U.S. District Judge Henry Lee Adams Jr. in Jacksonville issued a preliminary injunction against the expansion, saying the Army Corps had failed to adequately explore alternative plans that would cause less environmental damage to the area.

The article reports that, if the Mosaic expansion does not move forward, the economic impact would be dramatic.

At least 18 companies that do business with Mosaic would be out at minimum of $80 million in combined annual revenue, and about 400 of their employees would lose their jobs, in addition to the 221 Mosaic workers who would be laid off …

“If Mosaic is prohibited from further mining, it will mean that Bul-Hed Corporation would cease to exist sometime in the near future,” Ronnie Hedrick, president, said in a court filing.

Mosaic has estimated it would lose $250 million to $300 million in operating earnings in a worst-case scenario.  In its fiscal year ended May 31, Mosaic had earnings of $1.75 billion before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization on net sales of $6.76 billion.

Business Interruption Planning

The company’s most recent 10-Q (Item 1A – Risk Factors), filed April 1, 2010, did  disclose this potential risk:

Expansion of our operations also is predicated upon securing the necessary environmental or other permits or approvals. Over the next several years, we and our subsidiaries will be continuing our efforts to obtain permits in support of our anticipated Florida mining operations at certain of our properties. In Florida, local community participation has become an important factor in the permitting process for mining companies, and various local counties and other parties in Florida have in the past and continue to file lawsuits challenging the issuance of some of the permits we require. In fiscal 2009 environmental groups for the first time filed a lawsuit in federal court against the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers with respect to its issuance of a federal wetlands permit and similar lawsuits could be brought in the future. A denial of, or delay in issuing, these permits or the issuance of permits with cost-prohibitive conditions could prevent us from mining at these properties and thereby have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition or results of operations.

Even so, how should the company – and its business partners – respond to such a risk?  And did business partners understand, assess and plan for such a contingency?  In many discussions we have had with clients about potential shut downs, it is common for companies to plan production volume shifts across other operating locations to make up for the lost volume and continue operating.  In Mosaic’s case, however, the article states:

Although Mosaic has four other mines in Florida, their output would not offset the impact of a shutdown at South Fort Meade, the company said.

Even where a company has the physical capacity at other locations to make up for lost production at one plant, environmental restrictions may not allow timely production increases at others.  Wastewater and air permits typically contain conditions limiting production.  These limits can take various forms:

• Direct limits.  For example, plant operating hours or volume; emissions limits for production equipment or material use; wastewater flow or contaminant concentration limits.
• Indirect restrictions.  For example, fuel use or emissions limits on supporting equipment such as generators or boilers; wastewater treatment capacity/retention time for adequate treatment.

Suppliers, contractors and vendors may attempt to recover losses from Mosaic through the contractual obligations in place between the parties.  However, in this case, Mosaic has notified at least some of their business partners that this is a “force majeure” event – an extraordinary circumstance beyond their control – which releases Mosiac from contractual obligations.

Has your company evaluated/assessed the myriad business continuity risks associated with environmental matters in your supply chain?  And what contingency plans do you have in place to protect yourself?

Elm Completes Field Trial of iPad in EHS Audit

Elm has completed its initial field trail of the iPad for EHS auditing.

Lawrence Heim of Elm’s Georgia office:

In our week-long test of the iPad in an actual client audit setting, we used many of the features available in our selected data collection application.  There were other relevant features that we did not use this time, but expect to in the future.  To sum it up, the iPad and our selected application performed flawlessly.

• Data capture – over 50 pages of handwritten notes in this case – was efficient and error-free.
• We were able to create charts, tables and diagrams, as well as use a “highlighter pen” feature.
• The user-defined data tagging function worked extremely well to quickly identify matters needing further information or clarification.  That feature also allowed quick, easy access to – and certainty in locating – findings in the notes.  Data tags clearly indicated finding summary information for further convenience.
• Exporting the notes was rapid and seamless.  The resulting file can be viewed/emailed to the client in PDF form as well as other formats if needed.

I believe that our use of the iPad created a time efficiency of between 15% – 20% on this particular field trial.  I anticipate that we will see even greater savings as we become more experienced in using the available features the device and app offer.  Any company seriously seeking ways to improve on-site audit efficiency and reducing errors/omissions should evaluate the iPad.

As a result of this successful trial, Elm will be adopting iPad use more broadly across the company before the end of 2010.

If you are interested in having us demonstrate the iPad’s power in an upcoming EHS audit at one of your sites, please contact us.

Elm Survey on EHS Risk Launched

Even before the BP oil spill, there was a substantial chatter about “EHS risk”, what it means and options for managing it. In many cases, external resources such as consultants are brought in to assist with the effort. These resources possess skills that cut across various competencies, which can create ambiguity within the client’s organization about which department(s) may be responsible for identifying, vetting and hiring these resources.

Elm has created a survey that is intended to explore these issues.

To ensure your privacy, we have disabled the user tracking option on the SurveyMonkey settings.  Therefore we have no way of identifying respondents in any way.

Launch the survey here.

WalMart’s Hot Air

Yesterday, the world’s largest retailer and its cadre of sustainability advisors released the 61-page Walmart Supplier GHG Innovation Program: Guidance Document.

Elm has read through this document and provides a brief overview of what we think are several important points.  What follows is a combination of excerpts from the document combined with Elm comments.  Not all of these points are implementation “how-to’s”.  Some of our comments reflect potential problems that should be evaluated by suppliers who are impacted by Walmart’s supplier sustainability initiatives.

The program will initially focus on the following product categories:

Animal feed, apparel, candy, cheese, frozen food, fruit, grains, household detergents, meat, media, milk, motor oil, pharmaceuticals, produce, sanitary paper products, snacks, soap & shampoo, soft drinks & beverages, televisions, and vegetables.

GIVING CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE (TO WALMART)

In past articles, Elm discussed our view there is a true business risk – rather than competitive advantage – to first-mover adoption of GHG reduction programs.  We had anticipated that such risk would be rooted in regulatory requirements.  While that may still be a concern in the longer term, it appears now that the more significant risk relates to Walmart suppliers.  The retailer has specified that no credit will be given to reductions that are not directly related to Walmart’s GHG program, such as reductions required by law or reduction programs that began prior to 2010.

Further, to get a sense of how little the supplier appears to be in the overall process, take a look at the graphic on page 9.  Of the 6 steps in the Opportunities Identification, Prioritization, and Engagement Process, only one (Step 5 – Engage & Implement) includes the suppliers as an “actor” in the process.

Generally, for a project to count towards Walmart’s reduction goal, it can either be a carbon reduction for a product that Walmart sells or a reduction at a facility/process that supplies Walmart.

The reduction achieved must also be “additional” and beyond business as usual (BAU) in terms of emissions accounting. Specifically, the activity must:

1. Demonstrate that the initiative is truly additional, meaning that the action would not have otherwise happened without Walmart’s influence, and

2. That the initiative represents performance beyond BAU, indicating that the improvement is well beyond existing business trends and has the overall impact of emissions reductions within a product category.

Walmart is accounting for carbon reductions that occur by comparing a new product, or change to a facility, to a baseline. The baseline is determined by an assessment of the “business as usual” (BAU) case. BAU is defining what would have been the carbon emissions of a product or a facility if Walmart had not encouraged, introduced, or catalyzed the implementation of an innovation. It is important to note that the carbon reduction claims, rules for quantifying reductions, and monetization within this document are written under current regulatory standards in the U.S. If Federal or other laws change that effects the guidance prescribed in this document, they will be re-assessed at that time. This includes, but is not limited to: public reporting on carbon emissions regulated by the SEC, regulations set by FTC for marketing claims, carbon tax or cap and trade legislation or regulation by EPA, or carbon reporting by EPA.

MORE COOKS IN THE KITCHEN

As if manufacturing sites don’t already have enough folks wandering the production floor and telling them how to make product….

Generally speaking, Walmart can reduce product life cycle emissions by either influencing the development or design of the products them selves and/or by improving the facilities and processes used to make and transport products.

UNDER THE INFLUENCE

The document speaks in terms of Walmart’s “influence” on suppliers in order for GHG reductions to qualify.  The use of such a loose term may create potential conflicts in the future.

For a project to qualify, it must have happened because of Walmart’s influence, showing additionality. This does not exclude projects that were also influenced by other entities, programs, incentives, etc.

The Walmart Project Champion must be able to prove that the project would not have happened at the time it did without Walmart’s involvement. In this project, Walmart’s influence on the project is deemed as “additionality.” Additionality for products means that for a lower-carbon product:

• Walmart directly influenced the development or redesign of the products, or
• Walmart influenced the increased sales of the product.

Influencing the product directly means that Walmart engaged with a supplier to design or influence the design of a new product that is more carbon efficient. For instance, if Walmart encouraged a supplier to re-design laundry detergent to have a lighter-weight package than is currently offered, this would be influencing the redesign. If Walmart sought out a new detergent that was concentrated or eliminated specific raw materials that are more carbon intensive to extract, then this would also be an influence of the redesign.

And to further the point above about Walmart’s attempt to become involved at the production floor level:

For facilities and processes, additionality means that:

• Walmart directly contributed to the improvement of a facility or process, or

• Walmart influenced energy management.

GET A LIFE (CYCLE)

Product-based reductions require that a complete lifecycle analysis (LCA) be executed by either the supplier or as part of an industry effort. To claim a reduction, the LCA must be compared against a defined baseline of a reference product.   And of course that reference is selected by WalMart.

Reductions may be identified in any phase of a product’s life cycle. A product’s life cycle includes the following primary stages:

• Raw material extraction
• Manufacturing
• Packaging
• Distribution
• Usage
• Disposal

The WalMart Champion must identify a reference product against which to benchmark this product. The reference product may be another product that serves a similar function. As a reference product may vary significantly from the product in question in terms of technology, materials, or size, it is important to compare them on this basic level of function, also known as a “functional unit”. This is particularly crucial for products whose impacts greatly depend on how they are used at the consumer level.

For each product, the Champion must define and describe the methodology used to calculate the baseline and forecasted reduction potentials. The Champion may use a methodology that is best suited for the calculation, but documentation and an explanation is required. Suggested life cycle and corporate accounting methodologies include ISO 14040 and ISO 14064 standards, WRI/WBCSD ’s GH G Protocol Corporate and Product Life Cycle Reporting and Accounting Standards (currently in draft form), and British Standards Institution’s PAS2050 (see Part 5 for additional information).

ClearCarbon will quantify the difference between a “BAU” case and the impact of the project from a product improvement perspective solely. The difference between the two, or the delta, will be calculated at the initial submittal based on projected trends for five years or until December 31, 2015, whichever comes first.

BAU in this context would appear to include any existing GHG programs – or those that become regulatory requirements between 2010 and 2015 – and therefore become incorporated into the baseline, so no credit is given for those reductions.

SHOW ME DA MONEY

Walmart will not resell, retire, or trade carbon reduction claim s under this Program.  Additionally, the carbon reduction claims may not be “exclusive” to Walmart. It may be the case that Walmart will help a supplier, through this Program , to achieve a carbon reduction project that the supplier also wants to report publicly. In this case, both parties (Walmart and the supplier) may state a claim of reduction. Since the reduction is not being sold or traded there is no legal claim over the reduction that would make it exclusive to Walmart or to the supplier. The supplier may monetize (sell, trade, etc) carbon reductions at their discretion, though Walmart will not be involved in these transactions.

But per comments from CEO  from Mike Duke, the supplier should expect Walmart to demand that the economic benefit from monetization be reflected in the product pricing to Walmart.

GHG reductions that come from facility or process based projects require different financial value accounting than product GHG reductions. Quantifiable financial value to customers may include savings to the customer on energy or resource consumption during use of the product, resulting in lower energy bills and lower carbon emissions.

Financial value to the Walmart supplier might include the following:

• Fuel or electricity savings at a factory or facility level translated into cost savings through industry averages (e.g., average price of kWh x total kWh saved), or
• Material savings from reduced input purchases or a switch to cheaper materials/inputs.

In some instances either product or project based initiatives will result in a savings to the customer or a benefit to Walmart that are not financially measureable. In these cases, a qualitative description of the positive impact should be included in the worksheets. Benefits to suppliers and businesses may include:

• Improved business conditions,
• Public relations opportunities, or
• Increased positive stakeholder engagement.

The document contains no recognition of or reference to the economic value of EHS risk reductions for WalMart or the supplier.  But beware about claims of financial benefits – as indicated above WalMart intends for those savings to be passed on to WalMart by the suppliers.  Suppliers may find benefits in claiming “savings to the customer or a benefit to Walmart that are not financially measureable.”

THE BIG HOLE

The guidance is written in a manner suggesting that all suppliers manufacture their products at their own facilities.  A massive gap seems to exist relative to contract manufacturing.  Fascinating, given the astounding number of products sold by Walmart that are manufactured in China on behalf of a Walmart supplier.  Perhaps the company has lost sight of the fact that overwhelming cost pressures they impose on their suppliers has driven much of the actual manufacturing off-shore to third party contractors over which the Walmart supplier has no direct operational control.  And what about the overall supply chain GHG impact of the consumer having to more than 1 of a particular item after the initial item breaks/fails prematurely due to poor quality (like my daughter’s new $1 calculator that broke after less than 24 hours after purchasing it at WalMart)? I wonder if the retailer will take responsibility for something like that.